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BOOK REVIEW
The Right to Life in International Law
Reviewed by W. Paul Gormley*
RAMCHARAN, B. G. (editor), Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, (1985);
$57.50 ISBN 90-247-3074-0, xii, 371 pp.
The most grievous violations of the fundamental rights of individuals
- indeed of all mankind - become the focus of this excellent volume. The
distinguished editor guided a group of contributors during an in-depth
evaluation of the right to life as it currently exists in customary interna-
tional law, and continues to be codified in major multinational conven-
tions.' Nonetheless, the focus of this series of essays is placed on the fu-
ture developments that will assure effective implementation of the right
to life. Accordingly, this book reflects the philosophy of the editor, who
seeks to enlarge the effective protection of human rights by means of an
expanded and open-ended interpretation of existing treaty texts, as op-
posed to the traditional approach which tended to apply a restrictive in-
terpretation toward human rights provisions that restrict absolute state
sovereignty.
One of the book's main contributions is that a dynamic approach has
been adopted for the purpose of expanding human rights protection. Ad-
mittedly, the question can be asked: "Has the tone of the volume become
excessively dynamic or overly far-reaching in terms of current state prac-
tice"? Beyond question, the issues raised in this challenging text will be
controversial throughout the remainder of this century, as dictatorships
of the left and the right continue to arbitrarily deprive their citizens of
fundamental rights and even their mere physical existence. "[W]hile
maintaining a legal orientation in general, an effort has also been made to
be dynamic, to view the right to life from all of its possible areas of appli-
* W. Paul Gormley is a member of the District of Columbia and United States Su-
preme Court Bars. Formerly Leverhulme and Simon Fellows, University of Manchester.
A.B. San Jose State University; M.A. University of Southern California; Ph.D. University of
Denver; J.D. (hons), LL.M. George Washington University; M. Int.-Comp. L., D. Jur. Free
University of Brussels (VUB); LL.D. Victoria University of Manchester.
1. THE RIGHT TO LIFE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (B. Ramcharan ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as RIGHT TO LIFE]. The applicable treaty texts are reproduced in the Annexes, id. at
317 ff. See generally, B. Ramcharan, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FAcT FINDING IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
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cation, to examine the complex problems which this right encounters in
practice, and to address existing or future needs."2
The influence, in fact leadership, of the editor is considerable; how-
ever, it would be incorrect to assume that the contributors have been un-
duly influenced. There are, accordingly, points of disagreement that ap-
pear among the various essays. In other words, authors "do their own
thing." For example, the conservative approach is to classify human
rights and fundamental guarantees into three distinct classes: 1) political
and civil; 2) economic, social and cultural; plus 3) the newer solidarity
rights (or human rights of the third cycle), because of the different stan-
dards of implementation and enforcement that have been perfected by
regional and international organizations.3 By way of contrast, the goal
sought by action-oriented human rights lawyers is to abandon these clas-
sifications in order to employ the corpus of existing human guarantees to
precise situations. In practice, the right to life (the primary civil and po-
litical right) incorporates the "right to living" (which consists primarily of
economic guarantees). But as frequently demonstrated in the series of
chapters, such philosophical differences do not hamper the emerging
standards and implementation of human rights norms. Perhaps all per-
sons of goodwill can avoid being entrapped by such philosophical contro-
versies by devoting a greater portion of their efforts toward the practice,
rather than the theory, of human rights law. This position is clarified in
Chapter I, The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life,4 which rep-
resents the synthesis, and offers the conclusions and recommendations of
the project. Dr. Ramcharan brings together a number of diverse positions
for the purpose of analysis, and, secondly, provides a workable and uni-
fied scheme of human rights protection. Consequently, Dr. Ramcharan
assumes a law-making role when he advocates that human rights lawyers
"must, therefore, of necessity be in the forefront of the discipline, chart-
ing new courses, breaking new ground, and establishing new models and
methods." He illuminates this approach to the future role that should be
accepted by human rights lawyers by contending that: "If the interna-
tional human rights lawyer is doing his job well, he has to be ahead of his
colleagues in postulating new theories, in advocating the recognition of
new norms and in advancing new forms of action for promotion and pro-
tecting human rights."6
2. Id. at v.
3. Contra, Alston, The Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Develop-
ment or Obfuscation of International Human Rights Law?, 29 N.I.L.R. 307 (1982) (and the
sources cited). While in sympathy with the objectives sought by a number of contributors,
the reviewer feels compelled to concede the validity of the conservative approach by classi-
fying political and social rights as a distinct group of legal rights when contrasted with social
and economic guarantees, because of the different schemes of implementation and methods
of enforcement.
4. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 1-32.




The position defended by the contributors is that the right to life is
an imperative norm, a peremptory right, that is, jus cogens.7 Precisely,
the "right to life" is a norm of customary international law or a general
principle of international law which transcends particular positions, as
this right is codified in specific international conventions. As a result of
this interpretation of existing customary law, human rights lawyers are
"not necessarily limited by the provisions of particular conventions or
declarations, but must have recourse to the totality of the evidence and
the practice available within the international community."9
The further innovation becomes the scope, or the outer limits, of the
right to life. A restrictive interpretation of treaty texts, such as article 6
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,0 article 2 of
the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms," or article 4 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 2 is
no longer applicable. Yet, two aspects of this right to life must be consid-
ered, as the contributors so aptly demonstrate. The mere physical exis-
tence of mankind must be assured as a norm of jus cogens from which
states may not derogate, even during periods of extreme emergency and
open warfare. Simultaneously, the "right to living" mandates that a mini-
mum quality of life be maintained. Governments have a legal duty to pro-
vide minimum subsistence levels. Obviously, the problem of setting such
levels must, necessarily, be determined in each case; yet the significant
consideration is that governments are required "to pursue policies which
are designed to ensure access to the means of survival for every individual
within its country.'"
Related subject matter areas, such as the right to peace, the right to
survival, and the right to a safe environment are applicable. Environmen-
tal hazards must not be minimized, for the reason that the interrelation-
ship between the right to live and the right to a pure and clean environ-
ment are inseparable. Not only is a strict duty imposed on states, but a
legal obligation - a right erga omnes - is imposed on the international
community. As a result, measures must be taken by international and re-
7. The contributors assume that the imperative norm of jus cogens (and also rights
ergo omnes) exist in customary international law and is applicable to the right to life. E.g.,
RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 14-15, 186-87, & 190. This position is supported by the
reviewer; however, it must be conceded that a significant number of distinguished authors
attempt to refute the existence of imperative norms. See, e.g., Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law?, 47 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983), and Schwarzenberger,
International Jus Cogens, 43 TEx. L. REV. 455 (1965).
8. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 3.
9. Id.
10. Adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 49 U.N.
Doc. A/6136 (1966) (entered into force March 23, 1976).
11. E.T.S. No. 5 (1950); 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
12. Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica (opened for signature 22 Nov. 1969)(entered into
force July 1978), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 of 7 Jan.
1970; 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970).
13. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 6.
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gional organizations to prevent those environmental defaults that endan-
ger the lives of human beings. Here, then, one of the newer human rights
becomes an essential phase of the larger safeguard for human life. All too
obviously, uncontrolled pollution has the potential not only of destroying
flora and fauna, but also mankind: it is man who has become the endan-
gered species."
Conversely, the right to life is not absolute: in certain clearly defined
and limited circumstances, the state may legally take human life, and
these "permissible deprivations" are clearly set forth within the texts of
human rights conventions. But Dr. Ramcharan, relying on the text of ar-
ticle 4 of the American Convention, maintains that these "categories of
exceptions are closed and that no derogation of the right to life is permis-
sible outside of the permitted categories"15 as a rule of customary inter-
national law. This restriction on the imposition of the death penalty is
accepted within the orbit of the Organization of American States; how-
ever, is it valid to contend that other sovereigns are precluded from en-
acting legislation to apply the death penalty to additional crimes? As this
review is being written, public pressure is mounting in the United States
for the imposition of the death penalty for acts of espionage committed
during peacetime. Presently, this crime carries the penalty of life impris-
onment. At the moment, it is only possible to speculate as to whether
Protocol Number 6 to the European Convention of Human Rights 6 and
the Draft Second Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights17 will be widely adopted by the High Contracting Parties.
Gross violations of human rights - such as torture, lack of a fair trial,
disappearances of defendants, and executions during periods of emer-
gency - have increased in severity during the past year. It appears that
even graver deprivations of human freedom will occur in the final decade
of this century. Accordingly, the lesson is clear: there is a desperate need
for international cooperation and concerted action by the international
community, within the framework of the United Nations. To achieve this
objective, Dr. Ramcharan presents a thirty-seven point agenda for action,
for example the reinforcement of jus cogens, the enactment of the right
14. Accord generally, Gormley, HUMAN RIGHTS AND ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR IN-
TERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION (1976).
15. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 21.
16. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty; reproduced
id. at 343 - 45. Article 1 provides: "The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be
condemned to such penalty or executed." And Article 3 stipulates: "No derogation from the
provisions of the Protocol shall be made under Article 15 of the Convention." See also,
Explanatory Report on Protocol No. 6 to the Convention For the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty; repro-
duced in RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 345-47.
17. Draft Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-




to life in national constitutions, the imposition of international criminal
liability for' gross violations, the duty to negotiate disarmament issues,
etc.
Dr. F. Menghistu reexamines the basic definition of this concept in
order to come to grips with the main elements comprising the right to
living, i.e. its economic base.18 Not by accident, the Ethiopian author ap-
proaches this problem as one of survival; consequently, he speaks of a
human right to survival, namely the right to live. But this right involves
more than a negative approach that will restrict arbitrary governmental
acts; instead, a duty is placed on the state (and its organs) to provide the
sustenance of life, primarily adequate nutrition and medical treatment.
This economic side of the right to live brings together a number of other
individual rights to deal with the mere survival of mankind, since
800,000,000 of the world's population face starvation. In addition, the
newer rubric of human rights jurisprudence will also encompass some of
the solidarity rights in that the international community has a duty to
lend support. Indeed, one of the themes to emerge in most of the essays is
the duty of the global community - as represented in the United Nations,
its specialized agencies, plus regional institutions - to implement the right
to living.
Yet the difficulty of implementing such a global guarantee will be-
come all too obvious, owing to the package of rights and economic guar-
antees that will become relevant. Nonetheless, human beings will be pro-
tected when governments deal effectively with such matters as under-
development, socio-economic stagnation, and political instability.
It follows that the newer right to development assumes a special im-
portance within the third world. Hence, Professor de Waart, in a thought-
ful chapter,1 9 deals with the very foundation of any "right to survival."
Perhaps this right to development will go further in supporting the right
to living than dealing exclusively with survival, for in his view, "a right to
development may emerge as a right to protection by law against uninten-
tional non-arbitrary creeping or passive deprivation of life resulting from
natural or man-made disasters which endanger the fulfillment of basic
needs."20 Thus, international society will assume an accelerating role in
dealing with natural or man-made disasters that cannot be adequately
dealt with by states.
Professor C.K. Boyle deals directly with one of the book's underlying
themes, The Concept of Arbitrary Deprivation of Life." In fact, the con-
18. Ch. III, The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements, RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at
63-83.
19. Ch. IV, The Inter-Relationship Between the Right to Life and the Right to Devel-
opment, id. at 84-96. See also, THE RIGHT TO DEVELOPMENT AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
(R. Dupuy ed., 1979); Van Boven, The Right to Development and Human Rights, 28 REV.
INT'L COMM'N JURISTS 49 (1982).
20. RIGHT TO LIFE, supra note 1, at 89.
21. Ch. X, id. at 221-83.
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cept of "arbitrary" - to be contrasted with the legal taking of human life
by a state - requires constant interpretation and reevaluation, because the
term "arbitrary" is contained within international conventions. For in-
stance, article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant speaks of "arbitrary
deprivation of life." As such, the issue becomes: "Have governmental au-
thorities acted in an arbitrary fashion?" The issue of the arbitrary taking
of life by state agencies, even if permitted by municipal law, must be re-
examined in terms of regional and international criteria, guaranteeing the
right to life. This is to say, considerable disagreement arose at the time
these human rights conventions were negotiated, and compromises were
required, which had the effect of weakening the original goals of the
treaty drafters. Still, considerable insight is provided by the travaux
preatoires of the treaty articles at issue, for the reason that these provi-
sions have become general principles of international law and are also in-
cluded within customary international law. The primary consideration is
that the right to life is the foremost human right, upon which all other
human rights (and social guarantees) depend. The point at issue becomes:
"Which exceptions to this sacrosanct right are recognized under interna-
tional rights law?" The death penalty, consequently, must be reexamined
in terms of the subsequent evolution of international criteria.
Thus, the specialized topic, which continues to become ever more
controversial, is that of capital punishment. Dr. Sapienza examines the
International Legal Standards on Capital Punishment,2 particularly
from the perspective of future treaty commitments. Those international
norms that ban or restrict the imposition of capital punishment become
the main legal force restricting the right of governments to extinguish
human life. The primary examples are to be found in treaty articles, e.g.
article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant, which does not outlaw, but
restricts the imposition of the death penalty and provides post-sentencing
relief, such as a pardon or commutation. However, the compromises that
were reached during the drafting stage have weakened the commitment
undertaken by states parties. It follows that protocols, when ratified, will
abolish capital punishment, namely the Sixth Optional Protocol to the
European Convention of Human Rights and the Draft Second Optional
Protocol to the Civil and Political Covenant. Here, then, is the main
thrust (along with possible changes in domestic legislation) to preserve
human life at the global level, specifically a binding treaty commitment.
The next stage is to provide, first, the machinery for international moni-
toring and, second, a means of enforcement, especially during periods of
emergency or throughout a state of war, at which time governments are
more inclined to disregard their international obligations.
The recommendation offered, which could also be utilized as the pri-
mary conclusion emerging from the series of studies, is that constant at-
tempts to improve standard-setting, accompanied by supervisory struc-
22. Ch. XII, id. at 284-96.
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tures, be intensified, in spite of the hesitancy on the part of states to
restrict their freedom of action against their own nationals.
In looking toward the future, particularly the final decade of this cen-
tury, the right to life, deemed to be jus cogens, peremptory, and a right
erga omnes, must become the focus of United Nations efforts, and indeed
the focal point of the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, as so elo-
quently espoused by Professor van Boven, who contends, and quite prop-
erly, that "The protection of human life and the prevention of killings
could become one priority theme of the Commission in its future pro-
gramme and in taking up concrete situations involving gross and consis-
tent violations of human rights.12 3 Therefore, Professor van Boven offers
a number of precise recommendations, such as the designation of a spe-
cial rapporteur to examine instances of deliberate taking of life. These
far-reaching proposals should be evaluated in future studies that build
upon the foundation laid in this outstanding book.
23. Id., Annex VII, 335, at 340. The right to life becomes a recognized rubric of human
rights law, with the result that the literature continues to expand. See Desch, The Concept
and Dimensions of the Right to Life (as defined.in International Standards and in Inter-
national and Comparative Jurisprudence), 36 OSTERR. Z. OFFENTL RECHT UND VOLKER-
RECHT 77 (1985) for a reexamination of the expanding concept. See Dr. Desch's discussion of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1981 (proclaimed by the Islamic Council to
mark the anniversary of the 15th century of the Islamic era, Paris, 19 Sept. 1981), Id. at 79
& n. 8 at 81-83.
See also van Aggelan, LE R6LE DES ORGANISATIONS INTERNATIONALES DANS LA PROTEC-
TION DU DROrr A LA VIE (1986).
The evolution of these rights, enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (U.N. GAOR 3rd Sess. (I), U.N. Doc. A/810, 1984), including the right to life, is
discussed in Gormley, The Emerging Dimensions of Human Rights: Protection at the In-
ternational and Regional Levels - The Common Standard of Mankind, 17 BANARES (INDIA)
L.J. 1 (1981). Cf. Okere, The Protection of Human Rights In Africa and the African Char-
ter on Human Rights, European and American Systems, 6 HUMAN RTS. Q. 141 (1984).
1987

